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TAX TREATMENT OF STOCKHOLDER-TRANSFEREES'
PAYMENTS IN SATISFACTION OF DISSOLVED
CORPORATIONS' UNPAID DEBTS*
WHEN a former stockholder personally satisfies the debts of a dissolved
corporation, the tax consequences of his payment are not clear. Under general
corporation law doctrines, stockholder-transferees of a dissolved corporation's
assets remain personally liable, up to the amount of their liquidating dividend,
for the dissolved corporation's unpaid obligations.1 While Section 115(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code treats liquidating dividends as a capital gain
or loss to the stockholder recipient,2 no Code provision prescribes how the
*Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. granted sub notn., Arrow-
smith v. Commissioner, 20 U.S.L. WX 3325 (U.S. June 10, 1952); Commissioner v.
Switlik, 184 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950).
1. "Where the assets of a dissolved corporation have been distributed among the stock-
holders, a creditor of the dissolved corporation may follow such assets as in the nature of a
trust fund into the hands of stockholders.... Where the trust property has been used by the
stockholder for his own purpose, or disposed of by him, he may be held personally liable for
the full value thereof." Koch v. United States, 138 F 2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943). The basis
for this stockholder liability is the doctrine that stockholders who receive assets from an
insolvent corporation or one which is rendered insolvent by the distribution hold the assets
in trust for creditors. 15A FLErCHER, CYcLOPFDiA OF ParVAaTe Co Tio.vos § 7417 (Rev.
ed. 1938). A number of states provide for similar liability by statute. 13 id. § 6233 (Rev. ed
1943). The liability of stockholder-transferees is joint and several. Each transferee is there-
fore liable to creditors to the full value of the assets received by him. Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589 (1931). However, he has the right of exacting pro rata contribution from
other transferees. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233 (1937). Enforcing this
obligation, the Code provides for the collection through normal tax channels of an insolvent
transferor's tax liability from a transferee of his assets. IhNr. REv. Com; § 311. The regula-
tions define "transferee" to include the shareholder of a dissolved corporation. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.311-1(b) (1943).
2. "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in
full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange of stock" INT. Rnv.
CDE § 115(c). Without this provision, the proceeds of a liquidating dividend, above the
cost of the stock, would be taxed in full as an ordinary dividend rather than as a "sale or
exchange of a capital asset," qualifying it for capital gains treatment under section 117.
Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1932).
The basis for computing the gain or loss ordinarily is the cost of the stock. INTn. RLV.
CODE § 113. When the taxpayer receives his liquidating dividend in installments, he must
report each installment as a gain as soon as his basis has been recovered. T. T. Word, 41
B.T.A. 965, 981 (1940); O.D. 343, 1 Cumr. Buu.. SO (1919). Losses are not ordinarily
realized until the last installment is received. Dresser v. United States, 55 F.2d 499 (Ct.
Cl. 1932). But if the amount to be received is substantially ascertainable, the loss may be
treated as sustained in an earlier year. Commissioner v. Winthrop, 93 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1938). See G.C.M. 21966, 1940-1 Cues. BuLL. 130, reconciling the Dresser and lIinthrop
cases.
The tax treatment of liquidating dividends has undergone considerable evolution and
revision, particularly with regard to dividends in partial liquidation. See Darrell, Corporate
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stockholder may treat payments in discharge of transferee liability for corporate
debts.
At one time the Board of Tax Appeals held such stockholder-transferee
payments to be reductions of the liquidating dividend originally received. 8 The
taxpayer accordingly could reopen his tax return which had reported receipt
of the liquidating dividend, adjust downward the original capital transaction
to reflect the loss from subsequent repayment, and collect a refund.4 A Su-
preme Court dictum in 1932, however, signaled a reversal of this practice.
Enunciating the "claim of right" doctrine, the Court held income received
"under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition," though
subject to later repayment, fully taxable in the year of receipt.5 In the event of
repayment, the Court added, the deduction was to be taken in that later year
rather than in the year of original receipt.6 The Commissioner and courts,
as a result, considered the earlier decisions overruled :7 payments in satisfaction
of stockholder-transferee liability no longer reduce the liquidating dividend ;8
Liquidations And The Federal Income Tax, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907 (1941); 1 MRTNS,
LAw OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 9.77 et seq. (1942). At the present time there is no
difference in treatment to the recipient of amounts in complete or partial liquidation, INT.
REV. CODE § 115(c). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.115-5 (1943).
3. E.g., E. M. F. Leflang, 6 B.T.A. 4 (1927) ; E. F. Cremin, 5 B.T.A. 1164 (1927);
0. B. Barker, 3 B.T.A. 1180 (1926). Cf. Benjamin Paschal O'Neal, 18 B.T.A. 1036 (1930)
(taxpayer not entitled to deduction in year of transferee liability payment; however per-
mitted loss deduction for expense of contesting claim). Where liquidating dividends had
been received in installments, the transferee payment was first applied against the last
dividend received. J. C. Tomlinson, 7 B.T.A. 961 (1927).
4. See cases cited note 3 supra.
5. In North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932), taxpayer received money
in 1917 as a result of winning a district court decision in a dispute with the Government.
The Government took an immediate appeal, but settled with the taxpayer in 1922. The tax-
payer contended that the money did not constitute income until 1922. In holding that income
was realized in 1917, Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: "If a taxpayer receives earnings
under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income
which he, is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled
to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent." Id. at 424.
6. "If in 1922 the Government had prevailed, and the company had been obliged to
refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been entitled to a deduction from the
profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year." Ibid.
7. G.C.M. 16730, XV-1 Cum. BuLL. 179 (1936); I.T. 2981, XV-l Cum. BULi. 274
(1936) ; Schramm v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1941). In John T. Furlong,
45 B.T.A. 362 (1941), the board expressly declared its earlier decisions overruled by the
North Ainerican Oil case. The board held taxpayer, former member of a dissolved syndi-
cate, entitled to a loss deduction in the year of transferee-payment, despite the Commis-
sioner's inconsistent position that a loss should be deducted from the earlier gain upon
liquidation.
8. Roberta Pittman, 14 T.C. 449 (1950). In the Switlik and Bauer cases discussed
infra, this point was not challenged. But compare Commissioner v. Hartfield, 194 F.2d
662 (2d Cir. 1952) (recipient of excessive salary from insolvent corporation, though held
liable for corporation's tax debt, not allowed to reopen return in which salary was reported
as ordinary income), with Commissioner v. Smith, 194 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1952) (reaching
opposite result on almost identical facts).
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instead, they may be deducted only in the year when made.9 But whether
the deduction is reportable as an ordinary or a capital loss is unresolved; the
Second and Third Circuits recently rendered conflicting decisions.
In Comm-issioner v,. Switlik,10 stockholder-transferees in 1944 satisfied a
tax deficiency assessed against a corporation dissolved in 1941."1 The Third
Circuit could not fit the payments into the statutory formula of "losses from
the sale or exchange of capital assets," and thus granted the stockholder-
transferees an ordinary loss deduction for 1944.12 In Commissioner v.
Baucr,13 stockholder-transferees in 1944 paid a final judgment rendered against
a corporation which had liquidated in 1940.14 Following Switlik, and drawing
no distinction between tax and other corporate liabilities, the Tax Court up-
held ordinary loss deductions for 1944.15 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit
expressly disagreed with Switlik and reversed.' 0 The court "tied together" the
liquidating dividend and the stockholders' repayment, concluded that the losses
in 1944 "show up as arising out of a 'sale or exchange,'" and held the trans-
ferees entitled only to a capital loss deduction.' 7
9. Individual stockholder-transferees receive deductions because their payments repre-
sent losses "incurred in transaction entered into for profit." INr. REv. CoDE § 23(e) (2).
The Commissioner accepts this interpretation of the individual loss provision. See, e.g.,
Stanley Switlik, 13 T.C. 121 (1949), aff'd, 184 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950). Corporations are
entitled to deductions for all "losses sustained during the ta.xable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise." INT. REv. CODE § 23(f).
10. 184 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950). affirming 13 T.C. 121 (1949), 64 Hn%. L Rnv.
858 (1951). The holding was followed in: Frederick R. Bauer, 15 T.C. 876 (1950), rev'd,
193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Clifton v. Allen, 101 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Ga. 1952) ; Frederic
Al. Paist, 10 T.C.M. 967 (1951). Eastland v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. TeM.
1951) arrived at the same result without citing the Suitlik decision. These cases, however,
were decided before the Second Circuit in the Bauer case, discussed in ra, reached the
opposite result. See note 17 infra.
11. The five transferees had, in 1941, received liquidating dividends from a corporation
in which they owned all of the stock. In 1942, the Commissioner determined deficiencies
in the corporation's tax returns for 1940 and 1941. A compromise agreement vas reached
in 1944 and the transferees agreed to pay the liability, which for the principal stockholder
amounted to $22,487.62. Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299, 300-1 (3d Cir. 1950).
12. Id. at 302.
13. 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952), rezersing 15 T.C. 876 (1950). See note 17 if,:ra. Bauer
and Switlik are noted in 38 A.B.A.J. 245 (1952).
14. The two taxpayers owned a corporation which completed a series of distributions
in complete liquidation in 1940. In 1939, an action had been brought against the corporation
and its two stockholders for an accounting in connection with the operation of a joint trading
account. The suit was not finally settled until 1944 when a judgment of $95,926.52 became
final against the corporation and Bauer. Each of the two stockholders paid $47,963.25 (sic]
in satisfaction of this claim. Frederick R. Bauer, 15 T.C. 876, 877-S (1950).
15. Id. at 879.
16. Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734, 735 (2d Cir. 1952).
17. Ibid. In addition to his argument that stockholder-transferee liability should be
given ordinary loss treatment, Bauer contended that, since the personal judgment against
him existed apart from transferee-liability, his payment was fully deductible. Brief iur
Respondents, 1. 24, Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952). The court agred
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An individual taxpayer benefits from either an ordinary or a capital loss
deduction according to how advantageously he can offset it against taxable
income. Ordinary losses, deductible from all taxable income, can of course be
deducted only in the year when incurred.18 Thus, if the taxpayer in that year
has little taxable income, an ordinary loss deduction is not very useful to him.
Capital losses, on the other hand, are deductible in the year of loss only
from capital gains and ordinary income up to $1000.19 Any "unused" capital
loss, however, can be carried forward for five successive years, though still
deductible only from capital gains and $1000 of ordinary income in each of
the later years.2 0 But in general, taxpayers prefer ordinary loss deductions;
offsets against ordinary income taxed at regular progressive rates are more
desirable than deductions from capital gains more lightly taxed.2' In both
Switlik and Bauer, for example, taxpayers contended for ordinary loss treat-
ment which the Commissioner had refused.
Neither Switlik nor Bauer sets up satisfactory tax treatment of stockholder-
transferee payments. If the corporation had met its obligations prior to dis-
solution or had retained a reserve to meet contingent liabilities, the liquidating
dividend to stockholders would have been correspondingly reduced.2 2 For the
stockholder, that reduction would only have diminished a capital gain or in-
that "the payment of a judgment against a corporate officer in these circumstances would
ordinarily be deductible as a straight income loss." Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734,
735 (2d Cir. 1952). However, since Bauer was also liable as a transferee and, as such,
held entitled to only a capital loss deduction, "the accidental fact that Bauer was liable both
as officer and transferee, did not give him the option of picking which liability he would
satisfy, according to its tax consequences, when, as here, satisfaction of one liability dis-
charged the other... [T]he fact that he was personally liable for the judgment is super-
fluous." Ibid.
More recently, the Second Circuit followed Bauer, treating the repayment as a capital
loss, and reversed the Tax Court's holding, based on Switlik, of an ordinary loss deduction,
Milliken v. Commissioner, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 11 9284 (2d Cir. 1952), reversing
15 T.C. 243 (1950). The court reiterated that the repayment "was related to, and therefore
viewed practically was a reduction of, a previous capital gain or an increase of a previous
capital loss" and "by definition [transferee] liability stems from the liquidation distribution
which, under I.R.C. § 115(c), is a capital transaction." Id. at p. 45, 646. See note 27 inlra.
18. INT. REv. CODE § 23(e). A "net-operating loss," however, may be carried back
for one year and forward for five years. INT. REV. CODE § 122.
19. INT. REv. CODE § 117(d) (2). None of a corporate taxpayer's capital loss may be
deducted from ordinary income. INT. REV. CoDE § 117(d) (1).
20. INT. Rav. CoDE § 117(c).
21. Long-term capital gains, in excess of capital losses, are, at the taxpayer's option,
either cut in half and taxed at regular rates or are taxed in full at 26 per cent. INT. REv.
CoDE 117(b) (c).
22. Cf. "[T]he loss ... grew out of and was at all times potentially a result from the
distribution .... [T]he transferee liability [was] incurred solely because of a corporate
distribution of too great an amount; ... in effect, the petitioner is merely paying after much
delay the tax which should have been paid by either the corporation or the stockholders




creased a capital loss: one lightly taxed, and the other of limited deductibility.
Under the Switlik rule, therefore, stockholder-managers of a liquidating cor-
poration may find it rewarding to underestimate the corporation's tax obliga-
tions-the context in which transferee payments most frequently provoke
later tax litigation2 3 -and also to postpone settlement of non-tax liabilities.
WVhen the transferees do eventually meet their liability, the Switlil. rule re-
wards them with the more desirable ordinary loss deduction. Where tax
claims against the corporation create the transferee liability, the Code's sanc-
tions against tax underpayment are unlikely to deter such stockholder man-
euvers. The interest charges imposed by the Code for non-fraudulent under-
payment will usually not approach the tax benefit of ordinary loss treatment.24
And the Government cannot easily prove actual fraud, subject to penalty
rates or criminal prosecution, 2 5 or even the "untoward motivations" which,
the Switlik court intimated, might have resulted in disallowance of the ordinary
23. The transferee liability in all of the reported cases except Bauer arose from tax
claims against the corporation. For a collection of these cases, see 2 CCH 1953 FED. TLx
REP. i l 8,33.11-833.116. These litigants typically are controlling stockholders of closely-held
corporations. Ibid. See note 38 infra.
24. Interest on all underpayments is six per cent. INr. REV. CODE § 292. If any part
of a deficiency is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations with-
out intent to defraud, an additional five per cent of the deficiency is assessed. I1,r. REv.
CODE § 293 (a).
A six or eleven per cent added assessment will rarely offset the benefits of the transmu-
tation from capital to ordinary loss. Assume the sole stockholder of a liquidating corpora-
tion has a constant net income of $10,000 and no capital gains or losses other than a long-
term gain of $3000 on his liquidating dividend. Since only half of this gain is taxable
if the taxpayer elects to pay at ordinary income rates, his net taxable income would be
$11,500. If a non-negligent tax deficiency of $1000 plus six per cent interest vere assessed
against the corporation one year later and paid by the transferee, an ordinary deduction
in the later year would reduce his taxable net income for that year to ',940. The two
year total would be $20,440. On the other hand, if the corporation had paid the proper tax
prior to liquidation, the taxpayer's liquidating dividend gain would have been a2,000 and
the total two year taxable income would have been $21,000. The taxpayer has thus received
a $560 deduction worth, in his tax bracket, approximately $140. Reduced by the interest
payment of $60, there is still a net tax saving of $80. If an additional five per cent were
assessed for negligent underpayment the saving would be approximately $42 And in either
case, the taxpayer also receives the use of $1,000 for one year. The difference between
the two treatments would be magnified when the transferee chooses the option of paying
a 26 per cent rate on capital gains. See I.-r. Rnv. CoDE § 117.
The Commissioner has not challenged the transferee's right to take an ordinary deduction
for the payment of interest charges accrued since liquidation. See, e.g., Eastland v. United
States, 103 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Tex. 1951).
25. A 50 per cent penalty is charged against deficiencies "due to fraud with intent to
evade tax." INT. REv. Com, § 293(b). The Code also provides for criminal penalties up to
$10,000 fine and five years' imprisonment for willfully attempting to evade a tax. I.T. REv.
CoDE § 145 (b).
The necessity of proving a subjective intent to defraud, the wide area of reasonable
differences of opinion, and the often subtle distinction between evasion and avoidance impuse
a heavy burden on the Government. See Gordon, izcome Tax Penalties, 5 Thx L REV. 131
(1950) ; Spencer, Proof of Income Tax Fraud, 2 TAx L REv. 451 (1947).
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loss deduction.26 Likewise, in non-tax transferee liability the accumulation
of interest charges on contract obligations will rarely nullify the tax saving
opportunities suggested by Switlik.
The Bauer court's stretched interpretation of the Code's capital loss pro-
visions,27 on the other hand, seems unnecessarily hard on the taxpayer. True,
a lesser liquidating dividend would have reduced the capital gain resulting
from the distribution. But the court's justification of capital loss treatment in
the repayment year, by reference back to the capital gains consequences in the
earlier year,28 oversimplifies the matter. -Transferee payments often involve
26. "We need only note that the Commissioner has not asserted, nor has the Tax Court
found, any untoward motivation for the distributions in liquidations which should bring
about a different result." Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1950). Cf.
Clifton v. Allen, 101 F. Supp. 977, 998 (M.D. Ga. 1952) : "The dissolution and liquidation
of the corporation was made in good faith with no apparent purposes of defeating tax lia-
bility." But cf. the Bauer case, in which an ordinary loss deduction was allowed by the Tax
Court despite the fact that the corporation's liability xwas being litigated at the time of liqui-
dation. See note 14 sztpra. On appeal, the Commissioner did not attempt to distinguish
the Switlik case upon this ground, but instead made a frontal attack upon that precedent.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 7, Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952). In Milliken
v. Commissioner, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. 1 9284 (2d Cir. 1952), the Circuit which
decided the Bauer case rejected the transferee's contention that his lack of knowledge of the
potential claim at the time of liquidation made the Bauer holding inapplicable. Id. at p. 45,
646. See note 32 infra.
Assuming that some "untoward motivation" were found, it is difficult to see what a court
would do under the Switlik doctrine. After once holding the payment an ordinary loss,
it could not well turn around and penalize a taxpayer by finding only a capital loss after
all; the transaction would not be any more "sale or exchange" than before. The deduction
might be denied altogether, although the payment would be no less a loss within the terms
of the statute. Cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952) (oculist allowed business
deduction for rebates paid to doctors despite Commissioner's contention that public policy
was being frustrated thereby).
27. The Code defines capital losses as those resulting "from sales or exchanges of
capital assets." INT. REV. Coax § 23(g). However, the Second Circuit read § 23(g) to
cover not only sales or exchanges, but also transactions "arising out of a 'sale or ex-
change.'" Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734, 735 (2d Cir. 1952). But "not every gain
growing out of a transaction concerning capital assets is allowed the benefits of the capital
gains tax provision. Those are limited by definition to gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets." Dobson v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 231, 232 (1944). Moreover, the Second
Circuit on the one hand accepted the principle of the single year as the unit of taxation, for
the purpose of treating the liquidating dividend and the transferee repayment as two taxable
events in separate years. On the other hand, the court lumped both transactions into one
for holding the repayment a capital loss "arising out of" the liquidating dividend. It relied
on Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949), and Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 19,8), where stockholder-taxpayer had received contract rights of unascertain-
able value at the time of corporate liquidation. There taxpayers prevailed: the income sub-
sequently received from the obligors under the contracts was held to be capital gains as
an integral part of the liquidation. Thus these decisions merely implement § 115(c), treat-
ing liquidation distributions as capital gain to recipients. But cf. Duveen Brothers, 17 T.C.
124 (1951), discussed at note 39 infra.




large amounts, 29 and capital losses are of limited offset value. If offset in the
year when liquidating dividends are received, sufficient capital gains from the
liquidating distributon probably exist against which capital losses can be
applied to reduce tax liability.30 A capital loss in the year of repayment,
however, may be useless to the taxpayer; the repayment may well exceed his
capital gains in the succeeding five years as well as the $6000 of ordinary in-
come against which it can be offset L31 Thus the Baucr reasoning, though
viewing the transaction more realistically than Switli3, may harshly penalize
the innocent tax-payer.32
Orthodox application of the "claim of right" doctrine 33 accounts for the
inadequacy of the Switlik and Baucr results. The rule against reopening
29. In stockholder-transferee cases decided since 1941, the following amounts were paid
by the principal stockholders (to the nearest $100): Commissioner v. Milliken, S CCH
1952 FED. TAX REP. fi 9284 (2d Cir. 1952) ($03,400); Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F.2d 734
(2d Cir. 1952) ($48,000) ; Clifton v. Allen, 101 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Ga. 1952) ($6,000) ;
Eastland v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Te.' 1951) ($12,000); Frederic M.
Paist, 10 T.C.M. 967 (1951) ($8,600) ; Roberta Pittman, 14 T.C. 449 (1950) ( ;,00);
Commissioner v. Svitlik, 184 F2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950) (2,500); Estate of Mills, 4 T.C.
820 (1945) ($5,700); Koppers Company, 3 T.C. 62 (1944) ($200,000); Schramm v.
United States, 36 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1941) ($4,900). But cf. J. C. Wynne, 47 B.T.A.
731 (1942) ($120 transferee assessment vras deducted by taxpayer from his liquidating
dividend and the Commission did not disallow it).
30. Of course, if the original liquidating dividend resulted in a capital loss to the trans-
feree, an offset in the earlier year might still be wasted. But in all reported cases in which
the treatment of transferee payments was in issue, the taxpayers realized a capital gain
upon the original distribution. See cases collected in 2 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. f j 833.11-
833.116.
31. See substantial amounts of transferee payments in cases at note 29 supra.
32. The Bauer court, at least, considered the liquidation and the transferee payment as
related transactions. Of course, the court, even if it wished, could not have allowed reopen-
ing since the issue was not before it and the statute of limitations had run on the earlier
return. The court did, however, reiterate the "principle that a tax return for a previous
year may not be reopened to reflect a subsequent fact." Commissioner v. Bauer, 193 F2d
734, 735 (2d Cir. 1952).
Since, in the Bauer case, the suit against the corporation was pending at the time of liquida-
tion, see note 14 supra, the stockholders might have protected themselves by leaving a
reserve in the corporation. However, the Second Circuit has applied its decision in Baucr
to cover a situation where a stockholder-transferee, at the time of liquidation, had no
knowledge of the potential liability. Milliken v. Commissioner, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP.
1 9284 (2d Cir. 1952). See note 47 infra.
33. The prohibition against deducting a present loss from related prior income has
been applied to such situations as: relinquishment of royalties derived from land, title to
which was in dispute, McDuffie v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl. 1937) ; repay-
ment of judgment awards upon reversal of lower court decisions, Commissioner v. Alamitos
Land Co., 112 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.), cert. donied, 311 U.S. 679 (1940), see North American
Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 425 (1932), supra note 7; return of income received in unlaw-
ful transactions, National City Bank v. Helvering, 93 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938), cf. Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 33 (1952) (money obtained through extortion taxable as
income although legal obligation to repay), but cf. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404
(1946) (embezzled funds not taxable income-in view of Ruthin, of duubtful precedent
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an earlier return when income once received under a "claim of right" is later
repaid makes for the expeditious final settlement of tax returns.A4 Neverthe-
less, splitting what is essentially a single transaction into two taxable events
may, depending on the taxpayer's later income bracket or changes in tax
rates, arbitrarily confer a windfall or a wasted ordinary deduction." Tile
peculiarities of stockholder-transferee payments magnify the doctrine's arbi-
trary workings. The Bauer rule, granting only a capital loss of limited de-
ductibility, increases the possibility of a wasted deduction. 0 And since the
original liquidating dividend is a capital transaction, the Switlik ordinary loss
deduction results in an almost certain windfall.37 Corporate liquidation,
moreover, where stockholders can control the mechanics and amount of a
distribution to themselves, is singularly suited to profitable tax manipulation.,,
value today) ; and repayment of monies received under a mistake of fact, United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (recipient of bonus overpaid because of miscalculation legally
obligated to return excess.).
For other claim of right cases, see 2 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION
§§ 12.103, 12.104 (1942); Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 955, 960 (1946); Note, 154 A.LR.
1276 (1945).
34. "The principle underlying the 'claim of right' theory . . . finds support in its
facilitation of the taxing statute and that is probably sufficient justification for its departtre
from the emphasis on fixation of liability and the importance of contingency underlying
the theory of accrual." 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmF TAXATION § 12.103 at 301
(1942). "Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an annual
accounting period.... The 'claim of right' test has long been used to give finality to that
period." United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951). But see Comment, Taxing
Unsettled Income: The "Claim of Right" Test, 58 YALE L. J. 955, 968 n.53 (1949) (ques-
tioning the supposition that allowing refunds upon repayment of unsettled income would
be administratively burdensome).
35. Critics of the doctrine have emphasized the hardship, rather than the windfall
possibility. See HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION To INCOME TAXATION 237 (2d ed. 1949);
MAGILL, TAXABLE INcOME 204 (Rev. ed. 1945) ; Montgomery, Accounting and the Concept
of Income in LEcTUREs ON TAXATION 55 (1932) "[North American Oil v. Burnet] is
taxation . .. with a vengeance. It seems highly inequitable that the money as to which
litigation is still pending should be deemed to be taxable. It means that when paid back
later to the rightful owner, the temporary custodian may have paid a tax in a year when
he was taxable and it is cold comfort for him to be told he can deduct the repayment as a
loss when he has no taxable income." See further Magill, When Is Income Reali.ed?, 46
HARV. L. REv. 933 (1933) ; Comment, Taxing Unsettled Income: The "Claim of Right"
Test, 58 YALE L. J. 955, 956 n.9 (1949) : "Restitution may, of course, take place in a year
of higher tax rates or larger gross income, permitting a deduction which would more than
offset the original tax. But most types of unsettled income are unusual receipts which
substantially increase total income of the year in which received." See also Justice Douglas'
dissent in United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951).
36. See discussion in text supra.
37. See note 24 supra.
38. Transferee tax liquidation usually involves stockholders of closely-held corpora-
tions. See note 23 supra.
The use of corporate liquidations to convert ordinary income into capital gains has
been a favorite target of commentators. See, e.g., the excellent discussion in 11ittker &
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NOTES
Since stockholder-transferee liability is the only significant repayment situa-
tion in which the original "claim of right" receipt is a capital transaction 9 it
might well be excepted from the rule barring the reopening of prior returns.
Of course, the "claim of right" doctrine might be generally modified, per-
mitting adjustment of the earlier return whencver income received under a
"claim of right" was later repaid.40 But to make such a change workable,
the present statute of limitations on tax refunds would have to be extended"1
-a proposal of dubious merits. 42  Exception of stockholder-transferee pay-
ments from the general rule against reopening of prior returns could, however,
operate within the present limitations period. Where a corporate tax de-
ficiency created the transferee liability, the Commissioner would have to pro-
ceed against the corporation for pre-liquidation taxes before the three-year
statute of limitations in turn barred transferees from claiming a refund. 3
The former stockholders would have ample time to know of tax assessments
Redlich, Corporate Liquidation And The Icome Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437 (1950), of the
use of a "collapsible corporation, one more of the perenially alluring contrivances for
transmuting ordinary income into capital gain." In 1950, Congress denied the liquidating
dividend capital gains provisions to stockholders of collapsible corporations. I:,m. RL%,.
CoDE § 117(m).
39. Duveen Brothers, 17 T.C. 124 (1951), is the unique litigated exception in vhich
a deduction has been allowed. There a corporate taxpayer sold a block of stock in another
corporation which was redeemable at the issuer's option, agreeing to pay the difference
between purchase and redemption prices if the stock was called. The taxpayer reported
a long-term capital gain on the sale. In a subsequent year, the stock was redeemed and the
taxpayer was obliged to fulfill its guaranty. The Tax Court, four judges dissenting,
distinguished Switlik and restricted the taxpayer to a capital loss deduction. This type
of situation, however is not likely to arise often. See 2 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REi'.
ff 833.11-833.116; 3 id 865.37. Compare ,Villiam F. Davis. 17 T.C. 549 (1951) (corporate
officer, repaying corporation because of violation of 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
denied deduction although earlier capital gain was taxed) ; I.T. 4069, 1952 INT. RL%. But..
No. 2 at 3 (1952), 'ith Dobson v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 231 (1944) (amounts recovered
by purchaser of stock from fraudulent seller treated as ordinary income even though tax-
payer sustained loss on resale prior to recovery).
40. See note 41 infra.
41. Various proposals for modifying the annual accounting principle have urged
extension of the statute of limitations on refund claims. See Magill, Ihen Is Icome
Realied?, 46 HIRYv. L. Rv. 933, 953 (1933) (no limit whatever) ; Comment, 53 Yale L. J.
955, 967 (1949) ("such as ... ten years of the original return").
In United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 n.l (1951), the Court stated: "While
the suggestion [to reopen respondent's return for equitable reasons] might worl: to the
advantage of this taxpayer, it could not be adopted as a general solution L-caue, in
many cases, the three-year statute of limitations would preclude recovery."
42. See note 34 supra.
43. A refund may be claimed within three years from the time the return is filed by
the taxpayer or within two years from the time the tax is paid. IXT. REv. CuDz § 322(b) (1).
The period of limitations for filing a deficiency assessment against the corporate taxpayer
is three years from the due date of the return. Ixnr. Rnv. CoDr § 275(a). Moreover, the
Code specifically provides that a corporation contemplating dissolution may have its assess-
ment limitations period shortened to eighteen months from the time uf request I-.XT. Rv.
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for the years prior to the liquidating year.44 And liquidators might easily
protect transferees from a "midnight" assessment against the corporation
for the year of liquidation by taking advantage of the shortened tax limita-
tions period allowed dissolving corporations. 45 Contract and most tort lia-
bility is easily ascertainable. And although potential tort claimants might be
unknown, the bar dates on tort litigation and on suits against dissolved
corporations would generally compel initiating such proceedings before the
tax statute of limitations barred the stockholders from seeking refunds.40
Even when, at the end of the tax refund limitations period, claims against
the liquidated corporation were pending but not yet finally settled, adjustment
of the transferees' returns could be easily ensured. The dissolving corpora-
tion might retain a reserve to meet contingent liabilities, scaling down the size
of the liquidating dividends accordingly. 47 Or, at any time before the refund
CODE § 275 (b). The assessment period is extended to five years where an erroneous
omission from gross income exceeds 25 per cent of the reported gross income, INT. REV.
CODE § 275 (c), and is unlimited where no return or a false or fraudulent return has been
filed. INT. REV. CODE § 276(a).
44. For'example, a corporation dissolves and pays a liquidating dividend in 1950. An
ordinary tax deficiency can not be assessed against the corporation later than March 15,
1954. (The period runs from the last day prescribed by law for filing the return. See IVT.
REV. CODE § 275 (f) ). A stockholder required to make good part of this deficiency may also
claim a refund on his 1950 return, in which the liquidating dividend was reported, until
March 15, 1954. See INT. REV. CODE § 322(b) (4).
Transferee liability does not attach to assets transferred before the debt is incurred.
Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1933). Therefore, the stockholder will be able
to reopen his return even where the liquidation takes place over a number of years and
the corporation's tax liability is incurred for a year subsequent to the receipt of a liquidating
dividend.
45. If the Commissioner waited until almost the end of the limitations period before
assessing a deficiency against the corporation, the transferees might, of course, have
difficulty in claiming a refund before being barred by the statute. The Code provides, how-
ever, for a shortening of the period of assessment for dissolving corporations to eighteen
months from the time of request. INT. REV. CODE § 275(b); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §
29275-1 (a) (1943).
46. Examples of the limitations period on personal injury actions are: DaL. REV. Cow:
c. 146 § 10 (1935) (one year); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 83 § 15 (1951) (two years); N.Y. Civ.
PRA c Act § 49 (three years for negligence actions) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 34 (1931)
(two years).
At common law, dissolved corporations lacked capacity either to sue or be sued, and
pending actions abated upon dissolution. 16 FLErcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONs §§ 8142, 8147 (Rev. ed. 1942). Statutes have largely removed this disability but they
place a time limitation, frequently three years from dissolution, on actions brought against
the corporation, 16 id. § 8143. For a discussion of the use of corporate dissolution to escape
liability through shorter limitation period, see Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolutiotn--A New
Development In lItracorporate Abuse, 51 YALE L.J. 64 (1941). See also Marcus,
Suability of Dissolved Corporations-A Study in Interstate And Federal-State Relation.
ships, 58 HARv. L. REv. 675 (1945) (emphasizing criminal liability).
47. Retaining a reserve would also ensure that no stockholder would pay more than
his ratable share in meeting the corporate liability. The right to pro rata contribution
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statute of limitation had run, the transferees could deposit with a liquidation
trustee moneys to cover the contingent liability, and at that time reopen the
liquidating dividend tax return.4 8 If the claimant eventually prevailed, collec-
tion of his judgment would be expedited; he would not have to seek satisfac-
tion from individual transferees.4 9 And in either case, any excess remaining
after settlement of the claim could then be distributed and treated as a final
liquidating dividendY0°
To encourage early settlement of claims and preclude windfalls, permitting
the reopening of prior returns should be accompanied by denial of deductions
in the repayment year5 1 Thus taxpayers would be encouraged to settle
outstanding liabilities expeditiously, since only repayments within the limita-
tions period would qualify them for reopening their returns. And unless deduc-
tions in the later year is barred, taxpayers would be free to choose between
an equalizing adjustment and a deduction-an invitation to judicious delay
in settlement until a strategic deduction year. 2 In sum, courts should return
to their earlier practice 3 which recognized the realities of stockholder-
transferee payments: reductions of the liquidating dividend.
from other transferees, Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233 (1937), may well
prove illusory. The very fact that one stockholder has been required to pay more than
his proportionate share indicates possible difficulty in collecting from the others. But
requiring a liquidating corporation to keep a reserve, see Note, 33 A.B.A.J. 245 (1952),
is not an adequate solution to the problem of avoiding Barter treatment of the transferee
payment. Liquidators should not be deprived of the immediate use of their funds on the
mere chance that someone, unknown at the time of liquidation, has an outstanding claim
against the corporation for an undetermined amount. See note 32 supra.
48. Where a tax deficiency is assessed, the transferees, even if intending to contest,
might well pay the claim immediately. If then they succeed in reducing the liability, the
amount refunded will have earned six per cent. INT. R '. CoDE § 3771.
49. Besides the numerous procedural difficulties which face a creditor trying to collect
from transferees, see 15A FLErcHER, Cyc.oPEDi oF PRIVATE Cor-Tio.xos §§ 75S0(1)-
7593 (Rev. ed. 1938), other problems may also be encountered. For e.'ample, the corporate
assets may have been dissipated in mahy hands and transferees may be difficult to locate;
a creditor also runs the risk of the individual stockholder's insolvency.
50. The amount received would be similar to a final installment of a series of liquidation
distributions. With the 1941 repeal of the tax distinction between complete and partial
liquidation, this final payment would receive standard capital gains treatment, INT. RLV.
CoDE § 115(c).
51. This was the prior practice. Benjamin Paschal O'Neal, IS B.T.A. 1036 (1930).
But for the difficult administrative supervision, susequent deduction might be allowed
whenever the transferee did not learn of his potential liability until the refund statute of
limitations ran out. This, however, would be unusual. The Batcr decision is the only
reported transferee repayment deduction case not involving corporate tax liability, and
even there the suit was pending at the time of liquidation. See cases collected in 2 CCH
1952 FED. TAx REP. I f 833.11-833.116.
52. A loss deduction must be taken in the year in which the loss is sustained. INT. REv.
Code § 23 (e). But transferees might well wait until a favorable tax year and then compro-
mise the claim.
53. See note 3 mipra.
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